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Abstract: This paper argues that there are cases, which various guise of the good-theses concerning 
desires, intentions and actions would not allow. In these cases the agent acts for considerations that 
the agent does not regard as good reasons. The considerations render the actions intelligible but 
not desirable (where desirability and intelligibility can be objective or subjective). These cases are 
atypical, but nonetheless show that those guise of the good-theses which do not allow them, should 
be revised. In typical cases the intelligibility of desires, intentions and actions co-varies with their 
desirability: there are both unintelligible cases without suitable desirability characteristics and 
cases where desirability characteristics make the desire, intention and action intelligible. The claim 
here is that there are further more atypical and puzzling, but equally possible cases, where 
intelligibility and desirability come apart. 
The paper first introduces the Guise of the Good - debates about desires, intentions, and actions, 
and suggests distinguishing the category of “acting for a reason” from “acting for a consideration 
not taken to be a reason”. It then argues that while desirability entails intelligibility, and lack of 
intelligibility entails lack of desirability, these two cases leave conceptual room for a third 
category, which is that of intelligibility without desirability. This is so, whether we examine 
objective or subjective intelligibility and desirability. The claim is meant to apply mutatis mutandis 
to characteristics of desires, intentions and actions. The paper then provides possible cases of 
intelligibility without desirability, and defends the view against some objections. 
This paper argues that there are cases, which various guise of the good-theses concerning desires, 
intentions and actions would not allow. In these cases the agent acts for considerations that the 
agent does not regard as good reasons. The considerations render the actions intelligible but not 
desirable (whether we understand desirability and intelligibility objectively or subjectively). These 
cases are atypical, but nonetheless show that those guise of the good-theses which do not allow 
them, should be revised. In typical cases the intelligibility of desires, intentions and actions co-
varies with their desirability: there are both unintelligible cases without suitable desirability 
characteristics and then cases where desirability characteristics make the desire, intention and action 
intelligible. The claim here is that in addition to such typical unhappy and happy cases, there are 
more atypical and puzzling, but equally possible cases, where intelligibility and desirability come 
apart. 
The claim is meant to apply to desires, intentions and actions. The paper grants that in the happy 
cases, desires, intentions, and actions involve cognition of (what for the agent seem to be good) 
reasons for desires, intentions, and actions, which are based on the desirability characteristics of 
what is desired, intended or done. And in typical unhappy cases, the desires, intentions, and actions 
strike the agent as unintelligible and lacking desirability characteristics. Nonetheless there are 
atypical cases where the desires, intentions, or actions remain (even for the agent) intelligible while 
the agent judges that the intelligibility characteristics are not valid desirability characteristics, as 
they do not give (what for the agent seem to be good) reasons for desires, intentions, and actions. 
This is the post print version of the article, which has been published in Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice. 2018, 21(1), 21-36. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9850-x.
Section 1.1. introduces the Guise of the Good - debates about desires, intentions, and actions, and 
1.2. introduces two terminological stipulations, distinguishing the category of “acting for a reason” 
from “acting for a consideration not taken to be a reason”, and clarifying the relationship between 
the desirability and intelligibility of an action, intention, or desire, and the characterizations that 
render the action, intention, or desire intelligible.  
Section 2.1. argues that desirability entails intelligibility, lack of intelligibility entails lack of 
desirability, but that these two cases leave conceptual room for a third category, which is that of 
intelligibility without desirability. This is so, whether we examine objective or subjective 
intelligibility and desirability. Section 2.2. clarifies how the claim is meant to apply mutatis 
mutandis to characteristics of desires, intentions and actions. Section 2.3. argues that there are cases 
that fall into the conceptual room outlined in 2.1.  
Section 3.1.argues that the cases of intelligibility without desirability need not be cases of 
conceptual confusion, and section 3.2. argues that the view defended here is novel in comparison to 
slighly similar claims made by Alan Millar and Michael Stocker. 3.3. briefly restates the main 
conclusion, which is that the elevant cases of intelligibility without desirability should not be 
neglected in the guise of the good – debates. 
1 The Guise of the Good -debates 
1.1. A Debate about Desires, Intentions and Actions: The Guise of the Good 
This paper aims to provide new kinds of counter-examples to (some versions of) the guise of the 
good –theses about desires, intentions, and actions.  
The Classical View on the guise of the good has linked intelligibility and desirability very closely. 
The view goes back to authors such as Plato and Aristotle, and the debate was revived by Elizabeth 
Anscombe1.  
One strand of the debate have focused on desires and their relations to the agent’s conception of the 
good, such as Gary Watson’s discussion on value and desire2, Michael Stocker’s “Desiring the bad” 
3, David Velleman’s “Guise of the good”4, Jennifer Hawkins’s “Desiring the bad under the guise of 
the good”5 and Boyle and Lavin’s “Goodness and desire”6. Many views hold that desires are 
seemings (Stampe 1987) or appearances (Tenenbaum 2007) or experiences (Oddie 2005) of the 
good (see also Gendler’s discussion of “aliefs”7). Some critics of the GG thesis hold that there is no 
necessary connection between desiring something and holding it good: one can intelligibly desire 
the bad. 
                                                             
1 E. Anscombe (1963) Intention, 
2 Gary Watson (1975) presents a case in which a squash player feels the urge to smash his racket against his winning 
opponent. One might have this kind of urge even if one does not believe there is any value to smashing an opponent 
with a racket. 
3 M. Stocker, “Desiring the Bad: an Essay in Moral Psychology”, Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979) pp. 738-53. See also 
Stocker (2004, 304) on Joseph Raz: “I certainly disagree with one of his general claims, since I hold, and he denies, that 
we can intelligibly desire the bad.”  
4 D. Velleman, ‘The Guise of the Good’, Noûs, 26 (1992) pp. 3-26.   
5 Jennifer Hawkins “Desiring the bad under the guise of the good”, The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 58, No. 231, April 
2008, 244-264. 
6 Boyle, Matthew and Douglas Lavin. 2010. Goodness and desire. In Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, ed. 
Sergio Tenenbaum. New York: Oxford University Press. 
7 Gendler 2008. 
The other strand of the debate focuses on intentions and intentional action.8 For example Joseph 
Raz writes that the GG thesis, concerning intentions, and actions performed with independent 
intentions, consists of three propositions: (1) Actions performed with an independent intention are 
actions performed for reasons, as those are seen by the agents9; (2) Specifying the intention which 
makes an action intentional identifies central features of the reason(s) for which the action is 
performed10; (3) Reasons for action are such reasons by being facts which establish that the action 
has some value11. From these, it is said to follow that (4) Intentional actions are actions taken in, 
and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. This strand may acknowledge that we do 
have (intelligible) desires for the bad, but in forming an intention and acting, we actively decide to 
pursue the end, and thereby we must have seen something good in the end, or otherwise our 
intention or action is unintelligible. 
This paper is relevant to both strands. It argues against any versions of the guise of the good – 
thesis, that link the intelligibility of desires, intentions, and actions (too) closely with their 
desirability. 
Linking intelligibility and desirability is pervasive in the debates. Here are just some quotes: 
Stocker (2004, 303), notes that “according to the classical view, if there is no good in doing [a 
deed], there is no reason to do it, and thus, it cannot be done for a reason, and only what is done for 
a reason is intelligible.” Quinn (1993) in the same vain contrasts between what it is like to act 
because one sees something good about the action, and simply finding oneself with an unintelligible 
urge. The latter type of action is mechanical and alien. And Hawkins (2008, 247) explains:  “In 
virtue of the particular way a desired object enters awareness, action based on desire makes sense, 
in a way in which action based on the urges Quinn describes does not. This all too familiar feature 
of mental life needs to be accounted for. Describing desire as an evaluative state, one in which the 
desired object appears good, seems to offer the right kind of explanation. After all, pursuing 
something that strikes one as good has a kind of internal intelligibility.” (italics added). 
Joseph Raz (1999, 24) has characterized the debate centrally in terms of intelligibility:  
“typical intentional actions are actions about which their agents have a story to tell (i.e. 
actions manifesting an internal viewpoint about what one is doing, or is about to do), a story 
which explains why one acted as one did….It is a story which shows what about the 
situation or the action made it, the action, an intelligible object of choice for the agent, 
given who he is and how he saw things at the time.”(italics added). 
In Raz’s view, the distinction between the defenders and critics of the guise of the good – thesis 
boils down to the connection between intelligibility and goodness. The critics argue that the GG-
thesis “confuses the features, which make an action an intelligible object of choice with what might 
make it a good action. True, what makes it good also makes its choice intelligible. But good-making 
features are just one kind of feature capable of explaining the eligibility of actions, that is their 
possible attraction for an agent.”(ibid.) And the critics then argues that “that an action is hurtful 
                                                             
8 Including discussions on expressive action, e.g. Hursthouse 1991. 
9 Note that Anscombe’s version of (1) was slightly broader, stating that the question about reasons always applies to 
actions, sometimes the answer being “for no reason”. 
10 A rival view concerning (2) is that intention specifies the end or goal of the action, and thus the satisfaction 
conditions of the action, and thus are needed in telling which attempts have been satisfactory and which not. Yet, the 
rival view continues, the action so specified can be done for rival reasons. Say, one can save a person from drowning 
for selfish or unselfish motivations. (The debate on this then turns on rival action-descriptions. See Anscombe 1963, 
Davidson 1980. 
11 Of these, (3) divides theorists roughly into those who hold that desires are or provide reasons (which are desire-
belief-pairs as with Davidson), and those who hold that it is not desires, but desirability or value that is relevant. 
does not make it good, but it makes it intelligible by making its appeal to some agents intelligible.” 
(ibid., 25)12 
So far we can follow Raz’s characterization of the parties to the debate. The following 
characterization needs to be revised, however, to make conceptual room for the possibility 
discussed in this paper. Raz continues (presenting the objection the GG): 
“Once we draw a clear distinction between features which show an act to be an intelligible 
object of choice and ones which show it to be good or of value we will see, the objection 
continues, that reasons belong with the first, and not with the second. People will 
acknowledge, or brag, that they did something because it would hurt X, or because it was 
against all the rules. These are often their openly avowed reasons. And that is how it should 
be, for reasons are those considerations which make the act eligible from the point of view 
of the agent, and not necessarily those which make it good.”(ibid.). 
This paper does not contribute to the debate so defined. Rather, it drives a wedge in a different 
place: it asks whether there are “considerations” (or in Raz’s words “stories”) that can be cited to 
make the action and its appeal intelligible while not normatively favoured. They differ from more 
full-fledged “considerations” that are taken to give reasons for the action and make the action good 
in some respects, on the one hand, and from considerations that do not succeed in making the action 
intelligible.  
The counter-examples to GG discussed in this paper are actions for considerations that are, 
admittedly, not good reasons (for the agent), but which nonetheless make the action appealing, 
intelligible to the agent. 
1.2. Two terminological stipulations 
For shedding light on the conceptual possibility of intelligibility and desirability coming apart, it is 
helpful to introduce two terminological distinctions. The first concerns the notion of a “reason for”. 
There are three standard usages of it.13 The first is causal-explanatory use, that can apply to non-
agents: “The reason why the snowman melted was…”. The second is that of a normative reason, 
which (objectively) speaks in favour of an action (or other responses such as desires, intentions, 
emotions, beliefs): p is a reason for A to ĳ. Normatively relevant features give reasons for actions, 
and together they determine what one overall ought to do. The notion of a “motivating reason” 
stands for the reason for which the agent in fact acted. It can be mistaken factually (p might not be 
the case, although the agent acted on the assumption that p), or normatively (p does not favour ĳ-
ing, although the agent thought so).  
The stipulation is to distinguish a motivating reason and a (mere) motivating consideration. We can 
continue to call a “motivating reason” the consideration that the agent took to be a good normative 
reason, and which the agent acted on. In happy cases, motivating reasons are identical with 
normative reasons, in unhappy cases the agent is mistaken about them. A “(mere) motivating 
consideration” is one that the agents did not even take to be a good normative reason, but acted on 
it anyway; typically knowing fully well one shouldn’t. Importantly, this is not a mere causal-
explanatory “reason why”, and does not apply to snowmen melting. It requires the same 
                                                             
12 Raz adds: “Another example: that one has a duty to perform an action is a reason to perform it, which also shows it to 
be good, at least in some respect. But that an action will violate one's duty, or that it will break all the norms, also makes 
it an intelligible object of choice.”(ibid.). “people do what they do precisely because it is the wrong thing to do, because 
it is the anomic choice.” 
13 See Dancy 2000. 
psychological capacity of acting in light of a consideration, as acting for a motivating reason does, 
the only difference is that the agent does not think the consideration normatively favours the action. 
In the debates on practical reason acting for such considerations is typically called “acting for a 
reason”, whether or not the agent regards the considerations to be good reasons. For most purposes 
this does not matter. To call such considerations “reasons” is otherwise appropriate, but there is a 
danger of creating an appearance of a conceptual confusion on part of the agent, where there may 
only be substantively criticizable action and psychological complexity. In this paper, “acting for a 
reason” will mean that the agent took the consideration to speak in favour of the action and be a 
good reason to act; and if not, the agent did not act for a reason, but for a mere motivating 
consoderaton. 
Another terminological distinction we can draw is that between “desirability characterizations” and 
“(mere) intelligibility characterizations”. In the cases of acting, desiring and intending for a reason, 
the features that are the reasons are characterizations which speak in favour of the desire, intention 
or action, and which make them desirable (and not merely desired). Such characteristics make the 
desires, intentions, and actions intelligible. But even in cases, where the agent acts, desires or 
intends for mere motivating considerations, and does not regard the actions, desire or intention 
genuinely desirable or favoured by desirability characteristics, the (mere) motivating considerations 
may make the desire, intention, or action intelligible – and in such cases the considerations can be 
called “(mere) intelligibilility characterizations”. If such cases are to be found, in them the 
intelligibility characterizations can explain why something was understandably desired, without 
being (taken to be) objectively desirable. Or so this paper will claim.  
The terminological distinction between desirability and (mere) intelligibility characterizations and 
between motivating reasons and (mere) motivating considerations will be equally helpful for the 
critics of this paper – these distinctions can be used both in defending and criticizing the claim. 
2. Desirability characteristics make desires intelligible, but might other features do so as well? 
2.1 Desirability entails intelligibility, lack of intelligibility entails lack of desirability 
In this section we introduce the conceptual possibility of intelligibility without desirability with 
reference to desires, and the next section clarifies how it applies mutatis mutandis to intentions and 
actions. 
A desire can be intelligible thanks to the desirable characteristics of its objects (or of its contents, or 
perhaps of the very state of desiring that content)14. It is intelligible to want to eat ice-cream, as 
eating it would be a pleasant experience. The characteristic that it tastes good contributes to making 
ice-cream desirable. 
Indeed, here we can accept that such desirability characteristics always make desires intelligible, 
when they make the content desirable. We can further assume that the desirability characteristics of 
the contents are what give normative reasons for desires, and that it is the balance of normative 
reasons for and against that make the desire justified.15  
                                                             
14 Anscombe’s view (in Intention, §38) is that concerning desires, “the question ‘What do you want that for?’ arises—
until at last we reach the desirability characterization, about which ‘What do you want that for?’ does not arise, or if it is 
asked has not the same point.” 
15 The rival Humean view (that Anscombe argues against) is that desiring is not responsive to any features, but rather 
the starting point: anything can equally well be desired, and what is de facto desired provides (with suitable beliefs) 
reasons for intentions and actions.  
We can also accept that unintelligible desires lack desirability characteristics. They lack features 
that would serve as reasons for having that desire (and as reasons for judging that the content is 
desirable). The examples familiar from philosophical literature include “wanting a saucer of mud” 
(Anscombe)16 or desiring to drink a cup of paint (Davidson).17 
There is also phenomenological support for the view, that some desires may strike the agents as 
worthless, but nonetheless a state of motivatedness can be brought about. These states may but need 
not be compulsive. From the mere fact that something is desired, one cannot conclude that the agent 
endorses the view that the desire is intelligible: the agent may be alienated from the state of 
motivation, and regard the desire as unintelligible. 
These two claims have been contested, but I will simply grant these theses here: desirability entails 
intelligibility, lack of intelligibility entails lack of desirability. 
My aim is to point out that these two views leave conceptual room for cases, where the 
characteristics of the contents of the desire do not make it justified, do not speak in favour of having 
the desire, but nonetheless make the desire intelligible.  
This is so whether we think of desirability and intelligibility in objective or subjective terms. By 
“objective” I here refer to how things are, not just how the agent takes them to be; and “subjective” 
depends on the agent’s takes. 
In the objective “intelligibility without desirability” cases the (objective) characteristics of the 
contents of the desire do not make it (objectively) justified, do not (objectively) speak in favour of 
having the desire, but nonetheless make the desire (objectively) intelligible.  
In the subjective “intelligibility without desirability” –cases, the characteristics (as the agent sees 
them) of the contents of the desire do not make it (in the agent’s best judgement) justified, do not 
(as the agent judges the case) speak in favour of having the desire, but nonetheless make the desire 
intelligible (for the agent).  
The objective and subjective cases are connected. The objective cases of the first sort are at the 
same time cases of the second sort, if the agent is clear-sighted and the agent’s conceptions 
correspond to the objective shape of the situation. But if the agent is mistaken in some of its 
assessments of the situation, there can be subjective “intelligibility without desirability” – 
judgements even when it is not objectively an “intelligibility without desirability” – case. In the 
debates on the guise of the good – thesis, it is especially the subjective “intelligibility without 
desirability”- judgements that should not be ignored. For other theoretical purposes, the objective 
cases may be equally relevant. 
 
 
                                                             
16 “But is not anything wantable … ? It will be instructive to anyone who thinks this to approach someone and say: ‘I 
want a saucer of mud’ … He is likely to be asked what for; to which let him reply that he does not want it for anything, 
he just wants it …Would he [the other man] not try to find out in what aspect the object desired is desirable? … Now if 
the reply is: ‘Philosophers have taught us that anything can be the object of desire; … it merely so happens that I want 
[it],’ then this is fair nonsense.” (Anscombe 2000, 70–1) 
17 Tenenbaum (2013) adds other examples: counting blades of grass (Raz 1996), drinking coffee for the love of 
Sophocles (Raz 1999), being simply disposed to turn on radios (Quinn 1993). I will return to these when discussing 
whether desires are reasons for action. 
2.2. Reasons for desires, intentions, and actions 
What section 2.1 claimed about desires, can mutatis mutandis said about intentions and actions. The 
very same considerations (e.g. that ice-cream tastes good) can be a reason to desire to eat ice-cream, 
to intend to eat ice-cream, and to eat ice-cream.  
We need not dwell here on the differences between reasons to desire, intend, and act in much detail. 
A general comment suffices: A single desirability characteristic, on its own, can provide one reason 
to desire something. Typically things are more or less desirable depending on the constellation of 
plural characteristics, giving reasons for and against desiring.18  
To resolve to do something, to form an intention to do it, may require stronger reasons: to have 
sufficient reason to intend is to have stronger reasons for than against forming the intention. It may 
be rational both to desire to do something and desire not to do it, whereas it is not rational to both 
intend to do something and intend not to do it. 
Intentions typically are general plans to be further specified in action19. Thus, in addition to the 
reasons for forming the intention, there are reasons for and against any particular way of realizing 
the intention in action in specific time and place. Thus, it may well be that a desirability 
characteristic provides a sufficient reason to desire and intend to do something, but not a sufficient 
reason to act (say, because there are stronger reasons against any of the available ways and means 
of realizing the intention here and now). 
Despite these differences in reasons for desiring, intending and acting, we can here focus on cases 
of characteristics which in principle function at the same time as reasons to desire, intend and act,  
such as the one mentioned above: that ice-cream tastes good can be a reason to desire, to intend, and 
to act. The category of “intelligibility without desirability” will in principle concern desires, 
intentions, and actions.  
2.3. Intelligibility without desirability: the cases20  
This section will argue that there are possible cases of intelligibility without desirability, and so the 
conceptual room suggested in the previous sections is not empty. There are possible cases of 
intentions, actions and desires that fit the description. The cases need not concern acting, intending 
or desiring under the “guise of the bad”, but cases of silenced reasons can illustrate the category.  
Unlike an overridden consideration which remains nonetheless a good normative reason in the 
situation, a silenced consideration is not a good normative reason. A silenced consideration has an 
intelligible connection to the action performed, it belongs to a type of consideration that typically 
speaks in favour of the type of action. Nonetheless, in the context, it is silenced or “disabled” and 
does not in that situation speak in favour of the action.21 I will here assume that the phenomenon of 
silencing or disabling is both an objective relation between considerations “in the world” and can be 
judged and known by the moral agent, and be a subjective consideration as well. Just like agents 
                                                             
18 See e.g. Dancy 2004. 
19 Bratman 1987 
20 One usual case of someone desiring, intending, or acting in a way we can “understand” while not regard “justified” is 
that of normative disagreement, where the agent desires, intends or acts in accordance with her judgements about what 
is justified. As a bystander, I can often regard that agent as not desiring, intending or doing what is justified (as I think 
there is some mistake in her judgement), and nonetheless understandable (after all, she desired, intended and did what 
she thought best – what could be more understandable?). Such cases of normative disagreement will be put to one side 
for the rest of this essay. 
21 McDowell 1979, Dancy 2004. 
can judge that something is a reason for an action, and get things right or wrong in doing so, the 
agents can judge that some would-be reason is silenced or disabled, and can get things right or 
wrong in doing so. Mutatis mutandis, the discussion is meant to apply to desires, intentions, and 
actions. 
Let us discuss this with reference to a pair of initial cases (Ollie vs Stan in a burning building), and 
add four further contrast cases (Pierre vs Xavier; Watson’s squash player’s desire; switching card 
games; Jim and Jill 1 and 2); when the discussion advances.22  
Ollie in a burning building: Ollie is in a burning building. He is in danger. He could 
flee. His family is also in the building and in danger. Ollie could try to save his family. 
Ollie thinks that “in this situation, the danger is a reason for me to flee, but it is 
overridden”. Ollie flees however, and the reason that motivates him to flee is that he is 
in danger.23 
Stan in a burning building: Stan is in a burning building. He is in danger. He could 
flee. His family is also in the building and in danger. Stan could try to save his family. 
Stan thinks that “in this situation, the danger is not a reason for me to flee, it is 
normatively silenced”. Stan flees however, and the consideration that motivates him to 
flee is that he is in danger. 
Ollie acts akratically for a reason that he thinks is overridden by the stronger reason to help his 
family. Danger, for Ollie, is a motivating reason, albeit an overridden one. The judged desirability 
of safety makes his action, for Ollie, intelligible, although not justified. Leaving aside whether or 
not Ollie’s judgements get things right in this case, there will be other cases with such a mix of 
akratic action, overriding, desirability and intelligibility.  
Stan, by contrast, explicitly judges that he does not have a good reason to flee. What otherwise 
would be a good reason to flee (that he is in danger) is in this situation silenced. I will use the 
terminology of a “motivating consideration” to refer to such cases, where the agent does not regard 
the consideration a good reason at all in the situation – so it is not a “motivating reason” strictly 
speaking.24 I will not call this a case of “akrasia” (I reserve that term for cases where the 
consideration has been overridden – nothing hangs here on whether the term “akrasia” should be 
extended to the cases under discussion).  
The suggestion, then, is that Stan’s action is a case of “intelligibility without desirability”.  
Because the motivating consideration is (judged to be) normatively void, it does not function as a 
desirability characterization for the intention or action (let us discuss below whether the 
                                                             
22 The case comes from Kieran Setiya (2010, p.90) who writes that “the danger is not a reason for me to flee”, but it is 
nonetheless a consideration “for which I am doing so”. Setiya uses the phrase “the reason for which I flee”. As I explain 
below, I would prefer “the motivating consideration for which I flee”, as the agent does not consider the consideration 
to be a reason for fleeing. 
23 Another usual case of someone (desiring, intending or) acting in a way we can “understand” while not regard 
“justified” – even in the absence of normative disagreement – is that of non-radical akrasia. That is the case where the 
agent has some genuine reasons (that render the desire, intention or action understandable) which do not suffice to 
justify overall the action (or desire or intention) because they are, in the situation, overridden. That case is no great 
puzzle for understanding, and does not threaten the “guise of the good” – thesis: what the agent acts on (desires, 
intends) is regarded by the agent as a good reason, although somewhat akratically she violates her overall judgement 
what to do (or desire or intend). Such cases will not be central for this paper. 
24 The agent’s attitude is rather that “I did not have any reason to do it; that I did get some benefit was a silenced 
consideration. A virtuous agent would not have acted on such a consideration.” 
consideration is nonetheless a reason for desiring, even if it is silenced as a reason for intending and 
acting; to anticipate, I will argue that there can be both kinds of cases). So it can be a candidate case 
of “intelligibility without desirability” at least in the respect, that it is a case of action (or intention) 
which is not desirable.  
Is it intelligible however that the agent nonetheless acts on the consideration? This is a case of 
“acting for a (mere) motivating consideration” (in the stipulated sense), as opposed to motivating 
reason, if the agent thinks that as one’s family is still in the house, the consideration that one can 
save oneself is normatively silenced and is not a reason. Arguably, acting on such a consideration 
can be intelligible for the agent, and for interpreters. These cases are unlike unintelligible urges. The 
claim has two parts: (i) It is intelligible, although not virtuous or justified, to be motivated (i.e. to 
form a desire) by a salient consideration that typically is a reason. It is understandable, even though 
it is normatively silenced in this case. (ii) And it is intelligible to intend and to act on one’s 
motivation, even though a more virtuous agent would not act on the motivation unless it deserves to 
be acted on (a fully virtuous agent would not even have the motivation25). The link between being 
motivated to do something and doing it is inherently an intelligible one. 
How does this differ from unintelligible urges? Take two other cases: 
Pierre in a burning building. Pierre is in a burning building. He is in danger. He could 
flee. His family is also in the building and in danger. Pierre could try to save his 
family. Pierre thinks that “in this situation, the danger is not a reason for me to flee, it 
is normatively silenced”. Pierre further thinks that life will become a nightmare, pure 
anguish, existentially unbearable, and he will not be able to sleep well ever again, if he 
flees. Pierre flees however, and the consideration that motivates him to flee is that he 
is in danger. 
The more we add such qualifications that distinguish Stan’s and Pierre’s cases, the closer we come 
to the borderline, behind which the motivation to flee is not experienced as intelligible any more: is 
it understandable that one would voluntarily choose such anguish?  
Xavier painting a house. Xavier is painting a house. He likes the music of Sibelius. He 
paints the wall red. Xavier thinks that “the fact that I like the music of Sibelius is not 
even apparently reason for me to paint the wall red”. Yet, the motivating consideration 
that makes him paint the wall red is that he likes the music of Sibelius. 
Here we have a clear-cut case of an unintelligible motivation. Liking Sibelius does not give even an 
apparent reason to paint the wall red. To act on an unintelligible motivation can be an alienated 
experience.26 The suggestion here is that Stan’s case is not unintelligible in this way, as the 
consideration would in another situation be a perfectly good reason for action.27 
                                                             
25 See McDowell 1979. 
26 Quinn (1993) in the same vain contrasted between what it is like to act because one sees something good about the 
action, and simply finding oneself with an unintelligible urge. The latter type of action is mechanical and alien (See 
Quinn 1993, Hawkins 2008). As Hawkins (2008, 247) explains:  “In virtue of the particular way a desired object enters 
awareness, action based on desire makes sense, in a way in which action based on the urges Quinn describes does not. 
This all too familiar feature of mental life needs to be accounted for. Describing desire as an evaluative state, one in 
which the desired object appears good, seems to offer the right kind of explanation. After all, pursuing something that 
strikes one as good has a kind of internal intelligibility.” (italics added). 
27 Unintelligible desires and pursuits: The agent acts for what he or she finds an unintelligible motivation, which he or 
she does not regard as a normative reason; the action strikes him or her as worthless. 
Supposing then that Stan’s case is not unintelligible in this way – does it show that the action is 
desirable after all? Is there not something (taken to be) good, of value, in the outcome, for example 
that the agent survives? In a sense, yes. What is at stake is being guided by a consideration that one 
takes to be a normatively void consideration, invalid “reason”. It need not be pursuing what one 
takes to be evaluatively ’bad’. As we saw, the agent’s attitude is rather that “I did not have any 
reason to do it; that I did get some benefit was a silenced consideration. A virtuous agent would not 
have acted on such a consideration.” There is a difference between Stan’s case and Ollie’s case, and 
whether or not Stan’s case is intelligible, it is a case where the action (as the agent sees it) lacks any 
desirability.  
We are interested in the conceptual coherence of the scenario where the consideration is silenced, 
and yet the agent intelligibly acts on it. Stan’s case fits the bill. The conceptual room is created by 
driving a wedge between intelligibility and desirability. Stan acts for a consideration that suffices to 
make the action intelligible while not providing a normative reason for it.  
An objection against the very possibility of this category would be that whenever one intentionally 
does something, there must be some consideration that explains why the agent did it rather than not, 
and thus the agent must have thought that something speaks in favour it. That is, “you did it, so you 
are committed to the view that something spoke in favour of it”? But that is exactly the issue under 
contestation: perhaps some consideration may make the choice and desire intelligible even though 
the agent regards it as not reason-giving. After all, one may well contest the necessity of “you did it, 
so you are committed to the view that one ought overall to do it in these circumstances”, as the 
agent may have acted akratically for an overridden reason. Similarly then, one may contest “you did 
it, so you are committed to the view that there was a reason to do it in these circumstances”, as the 
agent may have acted for a silenced reason.28 While fully virtuous agents always act as they know 
they ought to, many of us seem to act in ways we overall ought not (often for very understandable 
reasons). 
Other cases in which one experiences a mere motivating consideration that is not a motivating 
reason could be Gary Watson’s (1975) well-known cases of a desire to smash one’s annoying 
opponent with a squash racket. One may have the desire even when one sees no justification for it, 
or no value in it (and if so, it is a counter-example to the guise of the good-thesis concerning 
desires).  
A squash player’s desire: A squash player is annoyed by his opponent and has a 
sudden desire to hit the opponent with his racket. The player sees no value in hitting 
the opponent, and thinks there is no normative reason to do so. The player experiences 
the desire as intelligent, as hitting would express one’s state of being annoyed, but at 
the same time experiences the desire as normatively silenced: hitting an opponent is 
not an action supported at all by one’s state of being annoyed. It is not merely 
overridden by the moral consideration that one should not hit one’s opponents, it is 
silenced by it. 
Here, there is an intelligible state of being motivated, that is, a state of desiring, combined with a 
state of thinking there are no reasons for that state.29  
                                                             
28 Alternatively, one may acknowledge that such a commitment is at place, while thinking that one did not meet the 
commitment (that is, acknowledging that one acted akratically or for a consideration that was no reason). 
29 Humeans of course would say that there are no reasons for intrinsic desires, but the more Aristotelean view we 
operate with here would say that there are reasons for appropriate desires, and that unintelligible desires are 
unsupported by reasons. And this paper adds that the Aristotelean view should have conceptual room for cases of 
intelligible motivation while reasons (or desirability characterizations) are silenced. 
A critic of this paper’s suggestion may again ask that if the squash-player does not value the desired 
end, are the desires not unintelligible? Well, they are not unintelligible in the way that the totally 
unrelated responses would be. Many responses are simply unrelated to the considerations (say 
painting the wall green because one’s annoying squash-opponent keeps winning), whereas some are 
related (wanting to hit the opponent who keeps winning; congratulating the opponent who keeps 
winning).30 Both good and bad options may appear intelligible and made salient and tempting by 
features of the circumstances. And in some cases, these options may further be (and be thought by 
the agent to be) normatively silenced. When they have the two features of making the action 
intelligible, but being normatively silenced, they fall into the category of cases we are interested in, 
that of “intelligibility without desirability”. These cases are just further illustrations of the 
conceptual room for cases of “intelligibility without desirability”, this time applied to desires 
(whereas the initial examples concerned actions and intentions).    
A different kind of case would be that of acting on conditional principles, whose conditions are not 
met. Here the case is less of a “silenced” reason strictly speaking. If it turns out that these cases do 
not actually constitute cases of “intelligibility without desirability”, then they naturally do not 
provide further support to the thesis of this paper, but arguably they can constitute another variant 
of such cases.  
Often cases of acting, intending or desiring something when the condition for its desirability or 
normativity is not met, are (unnoticed) mistakes, and one acts for what one mistakenly regards as 
good reasons (and thus do not interest us here as there is assumed desirability). But one may also 
acknowledge that the condition is not met, and desire or intend or act nonetheless. The following 
serves to illustrate a possibility that in a changed situation one still retains perceptions of saliences 
from a previous situation, and acts on such perceptions. If acting on one’s perception of 
significances is inherently understandable (even in cases where one reflectively knows the 
perceptions are out of place in the changed situation), these cases are cases of intelligibility without 
desirability:  
Switching card-games. You and I are playing cards. We have first played poker, 
where cards with higher numbers, or cards from the same suit, are significant and 
salient for the players. We then switch to playing some other game, where aces are not 
any better than other cards, and it is irrelevant whether cards are of the same suit. 
Nonetheless, these features may remain salient for the player: given that we had 
played poker before, they intelligibly retain their salience, even though they make no 
normative difference in the new game. They may continue to affect our choices in the 
new game, make some cards our “favorites” as it were.  
Cases like switching card-games can be cases of acting on an intelligible desire one does not think 
one genuinely has reason to act on, or that one does not hold genuinely desirable. More could be 
said about cases like this, here this case serves just as an additional possibility of highlighting the 
category of intelligibility without desirability.  
As a final pair of cases let us discuss a case that has been used in a debate between Kieran Setiya 
and Joseph Raz, and provide a variant of it. 
Jim and Jill. Jill killed Jim. Three considerations are advanced as explanations: Jill did 
it because she was jealous of Jim. Jill did it because she felt a sudden rage; a sudden 
                                                             
30 Cf. Hawkins’s primitive ’evaluative impressions’ on what makes sense. 
rush of blood to her head made her do it. Jill did it in order to inherit Jim’s wealth, as 
she knew that she would after Jim’s death.  
About this case, Joseph Raz argues that only the last consideration (“in order to inherit”) can 
provide a normative reason for the action. He argues that Kieran Setiya’s theory is unable to draw 
the distinction between acting for considerations that can provide normative reasons, and ones that 
cannot. He writes: “while there can be a number of (compatible but distinct) explanations of every 
intentional action, there must be for every action performed with an independent intention at least 
one explanation which meets an additional condition: it must explain why the agent decided to 
perform the action, rather than resist the pull towards it. Of the three examples only the last, only 
the explanation via a normative reason, does that.” (Raz, 2010, 126-7). Raz comments that “what 
marks actions done with independent intentions is that they are ones which their agents believe to 
have some value in them, agents have available to them explanations by reference to what they take 
to be normative reasons, namely explanations purporting to show that there is some good in the 
action.” (ibid.) 
If the claim of this paper is correct, this is slightly too narrow however for actions with independent 
intentions. There is conceptual room also for a fourth type of explanation in reference to 
considerations that the agents acknowledge do not make the action desirable, but which make the 
action intelligible. 
Tim and Tilly. Tilly killed Tim. Tim had wronged Tilly very badly, and Tilly hated 
Tim for that. Tilly did not do expect to feel joy or relief from killing him, in fact 
expected all sorts of negative feelings and consequences, but she just did hate Tim. 
She did not think there was any good normative reason to kill Tim (rather than 
reporting him to the police), but nonetheless Tilly has a story of why she decided to do 
it rather than resist the pull. What Tim had done made the hatred intelligible, created a 
temptation so strong, that giving in to the temptation is understandable, although not 
justified. The killing was an understandable expression of that hatred. The motivating 
considerations included the wronging that Tim had done. It can be the case that Tilly 
did not really see genuine value in her actions (no ”desirability characterizations”), but 
did think the action had a point of getting even (”intelligibility characterizations”).  
If this is right, then one can provide a story explaining intelligibility without resort to (what the 
agent saw as) normative reasons. The category of explanation by appeal to mere motivating 
considerations is not reducible to the other three types of explanations. (Of course, in some other 
variant, we can stipulate that killer saw that as a desirability characterization and thought there was 
a normative reason, but it is not that variant of the story that we are interested in).  
3 Further discussion 
3.1. Conceptual confusion? 
We can next ask whether there is conceptual confusion involved in (claiming there are cases of) 
acting for considerations one doesn’t believe are reasons. (cf. Raz 2010, 125-129). 
Normative and motivating reasons are in the happy cases identical (the very same consideration), so 
there is a conceptual connection. But they can come apart, there is no unintelligibility or conceptual 
confusion in acting for a consideration which is not in fact a reason; nor is it unintelligible that 
someone acts for an overridden or silenced reason. So it is hard to see why a conceptual confusion 
would be at stake when one acts for a consideration one admits is not a normative reason; while of 
course one is substantively criticizable for doing so. 
If acting intentionally is acting for a reason, there is no room for acting intentionally for a 
consideration that is not a reason. Could that be a decisive objection? But as already Anscombe 
suggested, intentional action is action to which the question ”why” in the special sense applies, 
including cases where the answer is ”for no reason”. These include cases of acting for no 
consideration at all, such as idle actions (such as doodling something with a pen while speaking on 
the phone) and expressive actions (actions that express one’s state of mind, but are not done in order 
to express one’s state of mind). The category of acting “for no reason” may also include habitual 
action, for example when the habit has lost its original point and the agent is not able to cite any 
consideration for why to act in accordance with the habit. But this paper suggests that in addition to 
such cases, there are also cases of acting for (mere) motivating considerations: acting for silenced 
reasons, or acting on conditional principles, when the conditions are not met. Further, one may in 
some cases know what one does independently of knowing why one does it. Thus there seems to be 
room for driving a wedge between intentional action and acting for a reason, without conceptual 
confusion. 
3.2. Is this a novel view?  
Has the “intelligibility without desirability” - view defended here been discussed before? I think it 
has not. For example such authors as Alan Millar and Michael Stocker, who in some respects come 
close, retain the idea that motivating considerations are reasons. 
Alan Millar in Understanding People suggests that there can be intentional action directed at 
something that one in no way values; and suggests that the constitutive aim of action is not to be 
cashed out in terms of value, but ’having a point’.31 Millar however links “having a point” to 
assumed normative reasons, thus not defending the “intelligibility without desirability” – view 
formulated here. For the classical view, actions have a point if there is something valuable or 
desirable in them, which speaks in favour of, or gives reasons to them, and actions are unintelligible 
otherwise. Millar suggests that actions may have a point which gives a reason to them, even while 
there is nothing valuable or desirable in them; but Millar does not consider the possibility whether 
there might be a point in acting for mere motivating considerations. 
Similarly, Stocker defends the idea that reasons to do something bad are nonetheless taken as 
reasons.32 Stocker’s reasonbad is taken to be a good normative reason to pursue bad ends. By 
                                                             
31 “Defenders of the classical theory are committed to supposing that the end sought—hurting others, or drawing the 
attention of others—is conceived as being in some way good or at least as a means to some good. So far as I can see, 
nothing in logic, or experience of human conduct and feeling, requires this to be so. If the agent in some sense places a 
value on such ends, this amounts to no more than being drawn towards them. That the agent is thus drawn is compatible 
with his not being at that point in any way guided by considerations counting for and against the desirability of the 
ends.”(Millar 2004, 66). “A natural suggestion, then, is that the constitutive aim of intentional action is that the intended 
action should in one way or another have a point.”(Millar 2004, 67) 
 
32 “My overall aim here will be to show that what makes for intelligibility in action is being able to answer Anscombe’s 
question, ‘What do you want that for?’ in a certain way. Raz holds that this way is, or includes, that, according to the 
agent’s lights, it is good. I will argue that although sometimes that does provide a satisfactory answer, often it does not. 
I will also argue that citing what is bad or is seen as bad can sometimes suffice.”(Stocker 2004, 313). “So, I do not agree 
that all reasons, including reasonsbad, must have normative force in the sense of being aimed at the good. None the less, 
I think they can have normative force in other ways. Here are some of these ways. The person with that reasonbad may 
regret, and think he deserves being chided or mocked for, not having the courage of his convictions when he acts 
against it or when he simply fails to act on it. Similarly, he may congratulate himself when, despite pressure to the 
contrary, he acts on it. He may, in this sense, show that he thinks the reasonbad is to be acted on.”(Stocker 2004, 313) 
contrast, this paper has been interested in cases of acting for considerations that are not taken to be 
normative reasons or have “normative force”. Thus, both Millar and Stocker drive a wedge in a 
different place than this paper. 
3.3. Is intelligibility at base a kind of desirability? 
The thesis defended in this paper would collapse if intelligibility would at base be a kind of 
desirability.33 This paper has assumed that the desirability of desires, intentions, and actions is a 
“thin” category dependent in each case on some characteristic that suffice to makes the desire, 
intention, or action desirable. In different cases the characteristic may be different, as there is a 
plurality of such characteristics, and so in different cases the thin feature of “being desirable” is 
grounded in a different feature.  
The paper has assumed the same about intelligibility. It, too, depends on characteristics that may in 
different cases be different, and the thin feature of “being intelligible” is in different cases grounded 
on different intelligibility characteristics. 
If desirability and intelligibility turn out to be the same feature, then of course this paper’s central 
thesis collapses. But it would be a surprising finding if they turn out to be so. Analytically or 
conceptually, we can understand the difference between desiring and understanding, and thereby the 
difference between something being appropriately desired and something being graspable by 
understanding. A theory defending the identity of these features would have the burden of showing 
how they, despite appearances, turn out to be the same feature. This paper has merely assumed that 
the appearances are not misleading, and they are not the same feature.  
But despite being different features, they might be coextensive. The central claim of this paper has 
been that the defenders and critics of the guise of the good – thesis, who unreflectively have 
assumed them to be coextensive have just not tried hard enough to see whether they might come 
apart. Section 2.1. granted that all desirability characteristics are at the same time intelligibility 
characteristic: same features can make the desire, intention, or action desirable and intelligible. Yet, 
there may be features (such as silenced reasons) that make the desire, intention, or action intelligible 
but not desirable. 
One more possibility might be that the thin feature of intelligibility might in itself always suffice to 
make the desire, intention, or action desirable. That is a substantive claim, and can be tested in light 
of putative counter-examples. The cases in 2.3 are meant to be counter-examples: acting for a 
silenced reason is not desirable, despite being intelligible. If so, intelligibility does not always 
suffice for desirability. 
3.4. Conclusion 
While the defenders of the guise of the good – thesis may be right about the normal cases, this paper 
has tried to show that some actions or choices can be intelligible even when they are not desirable: 
it is understandable to act for silenced reasons, for conditional principles when the condition is not 
met, and for desires that one in no way values. Similarly, it can be intelligible to have intentions and 
desires in the absence of characterizations that make them desirable. It is possible to have 
intelligibility without desirability, in desires, intentions, and actions. This is so whether we interpret 
intelligibility and desirability objectively or subjectively.  
                                                             
33 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing this point. 
The paper has also argued that in the subjective cases of intelligibility without desirability, the guise 
of the good – thesis does not hold.34 
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